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Income Inequality as a Moral Hazard

Recently, the Washington Post published an article entitled “Breakaway Wealth: With executive pay, rich pull away from the rest of America.”  This article, as the name implies, is a study of the wealth inequality in the US.  One statistic given by the author gleaned from a study of tax data for the richest Americans shows that as of 2008, the top wage earners in the US earned a disproportionate amount of income in comparison with their numbers; the top 0.1% of wage earners, 152,000 people, took home approximately 10% of the total amount of money earned by the entire workforce, with an average earnings of $5.6 million dollars per annum.  In comparison, the bottom 90% of wage earners, approximately 136,800,000 people, earn an average wage of $31,244.  When inflation is taken into account, over the last 40 years wages for the top 0.1% have grown by 385%, while for the bottom 90% wages have shrunk by 1%, with corporate executives making up the largest single group (~41%) within the elite cadre.

While income disparity is inevitable in a capitalist society, the sheer size of the gulf between the richest Americans and the average wage earner when taken in concert with rulings such as Citizen’s United vs. the F.E.C and the advent of PAC’s and Super PAC’s essentially undermines the fundamental concept of political equality for all citizens.  This inequality allows the rich (and the corporations that they control) to have a much more influential political voice than the rest of society by allowing these groups to spend unlimited amounts of money to promote candidates and legislation.  This in itself is not morally suspect; however, it becomes so when this power is used not for the public good but for the enrichment of the corporation (or corporations) which in turn leads to the further enrichment of executives or is used to undermine the basic rights and/or quality of life of others.  In effect, these executives are using the public processes of democracy for personal gain at the expense of the average person; the very people that the system of representative republicanism is meant to empower.

Proponents of supply-side economics, commonly known as trickle-down economics, argue that this inequality leads to the enrichment of all levels of society as these super rich people spend money which then enters the economy and benefits those lower down the food chain. Due to the fact that all segments of society benefits from this trickle-down effect, it is actually right for those with money to exercise political power in an attempt to gain more wealth.  Yet as the data given by the authors of the study show, this is not the case; the lower 90% of income earners have not benefited from the massive consolidation of wealth by the richest 0.1%.  As such, this trickle-down argument is specious.

As long as the consolidation of massive amounts of wealth in the hands of a few continues, which is then used to promote policy that further enriches these people while the rights and freedoms of the vast majority of people are imperilled, such gross income inequality will remain a moral hazard.

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Posted by on June 19, 2011 in musings, Philosophy, politics

 

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Jefferson on Partisanship.

“I am not a federalist, because I never submitted the whole system of my opinions to the creed of any party of men whatever, in religion, in philosophy, in politics or in anything else, where I was capable of thinking for myself. Such an addiction, is the last degradation of a free and moral agent. If I could not go to heaven but with a party, I would not go there at all.” — Thomas Jefferson writing to Francis Hopkinson, 3/13/1789.

With partisanship being the order of the day in today’s political arena, a few minutes of reflection on the above quotation by one of America’s pre-eminent political philosophers seems appropriate.  For Jefferson, as he so clearly states, partisanship was not just a political issue, but a moral one. Today this may not seem as self-evident as it did to Jefferson 212 years ago, especially given the complex nature of politics and modern life in general. In fact, identifying with a party can be beneficial in many ways; it helps one express core values, it connects one to others and helps one feel be part of a community of like-minded individuals, and for the more practical reason of getting politically difficult things done. By identifying with a party one is staking a claim in the political landscape, which in turn helps one construct a political identity of one’s own; by banding together to get difficult political actions done we are shaping our nation. To argue that these functions of partisanship are degrading to a free and moral agent seems to be overstating the case against partisanship. But for Jefferson it is not the mere act of identifying with a party that has moral consequences, rather it is the act of uncritically accepting a political dogma that is morally degrading, an act that often goes hand-in-hand with party identification; I think he is right.

In a democratic or republican system where the people are entrusted with helping shape the face of the nation through acts of political decision making, one has a responsibility to be an engaged and informed citizen. Responsibilities place a level of moral obligation on a free and moral agent; when one shirks a responsibility one is making a moral decision to not fulfill one’s obligations. By accepting a political dogma blindly one is not acting as an informed citizen. Therefore, when one accepts a political dogma blindly, one is shirking one’s responsibility to be an informed citizen, and in doing so one fails to fulfill one’s moral obligations as a participant in a democratic or republican society.

However, there are those who would argue that responsibility and moral obligation are not necessary nor sufficient determinants of an act’s moral value; rather moral value is a result of the consequences of one’s actions. Even here I think Jefferson’s claim stands. One of the mains acts of citizenship in a democratic or republican nation is the election of public officials. These public officials then act as the people’s delegates who directly from public policy. Those who accept a political dogma uncritically are very likely to vote for a public official based solely on party affiliation, and not from a standpoint of an informed citizen that has carefully weighed the candidate’s positions. If enough people vote in this manner, ideologues get elected; these ideologues are harmful to a democratic nation for their votes more often reflect their ideologies rather than the general public interest (for instance the election of Don McElroy DDS, whose ideology has seriously changed the way social studies will be taught to many American schoolchildren for the next decade, is a prime example). Therefore, when one uncritically accepts a political dogma, serious negative consequences for the public good may occur as a result of that choice. If consequences reflect moral value and uncritically accepting the party line results in negative political consequences then uncritically accepting the party line has negative moral value.

 
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Posted by on April 18, 2011 in Uncategorized

 

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Intellectual Balkanization and the Internet.

The internet is a wonderful thing.  As in no previous time in history, anyone with a connected computer can search the world’s store of knowledge, interact in real-time with people halfway around the globe, view artifacts hidden away in museums in cities one will never get to visit, and more.  Yet it has its downside.  While much of the world is but a few keystrokes and clicks away, the internet allows us to filter the information that we receive to such an extent that we never have to be exposed to a dissenting point-of-view, if we so choose.  Sadly, many are choosing just that. 

In a grand irony, the internet, despite allowing easy access to a large portion of the world’s intellectual and cultural output, makes it easier than ever before to sequester ourselves away, to hide from viewpoints that challenge our assumptions, to fortify ourselves with a near impenetrable armour of information and propaganda, and to surround ourselves with like-minded individuals.  We can read blogs, forums or feeds that support our basic beliefs on just about any subject, get news from sources that promote our specific political, religious, or moral worldview, and find information to denigrate those who dare to think differently.  This is dangerous.  For it is when one is exposed only to those ideas that support one’s beliefs and ideologies that the art of critical thinking is lost. 

Learning and growth is achieved through critical reflection brought about by intellectual disequilibrium; when opposing facts, beliefs and ideas are presented to us it forces us to think, inquire and question.  This new information may not change what we believe true, but the very act of thinking about these ideas helps us reach a new understanding of the strengths and weakness of our own positions and gives insight as to why others think the way they do.  However, more than personal growth is at stake.  

When one surrounds themselves with a given worldview, one is never brought into this state of healthy intellectual imbalance. Without disequilibrium, the need to think about issues critically never presents itself.  Without the opportunity or need to think deeply about issues the ability for critical thinking atrophies, withers away and dies. When the ability to think critically is lost, civil discourse becomes impossible.  When civil discourse is impossible, discussion of the issues at hand becomes a war of competing ideologies, with neither side listening  to (nor able to understand) the other.  When this happens the tension builds with each salvo fired, the emnity grows, and the will and desire to understand the ideas of the other lessens, and the need to further distance ourselves from dissenting thoughts increases.

In short, the internet has enabled us to draw up virtual borders delimited by ideology, and create intangible “states” whose citizens are openly hostile to those who choose not to pledge allegiance to the Weltanschuung of that particular piece of intellectual real-estate.  This is dangerous.   Just as the fragmentation of the Balkan Peninsula into ethnic, religious and political enclaves lead to years of bloodshed, anguish, mistrust, hatred, and strife, the type of intellectual Balkanization made possible by the advent of the internet is just as worrisome.  While the internet is perhaps unparalleled in human history as a means of connecting with and understanding the so-called Other, it is also a tool that can promote divisiveness if used unwisely.

 
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Posted by on February 28, 2011 in musings, Philosophy

 

On Discussions of Atheism in Online Fora.

After reading many online posts, facebook discussions and other fora about religion, more specifically atheists response to religion and belief, it pains me to discover that those who most vehemently support atheism and attack religion or belief in a deity are those who have very little idea about what it is that they are attacking.   It seems to me that if one is going to engage in a full-frontal assault on another worldview the least one should do is to make an effort understand that worldview.  To do otherwise is absurd. Even more disturbing is that it seems that many atheists fail to take time to fully explore and understand their own worldview, and the limits of that worldview.  This is intellectually irresponsible.

For example, in many instances the rallying cry of many militant atheists is that a lack of evidence that could justify belief in a deity shows that such a belief is irrational.  Many atheists invoke science in their polemics, making claims to the effect that one should only believe what one has hard, empirical evidence to believe. Ironically, many atheists who demand evidence for beliefs, when asked why they believe that two hydrogen atoms when combined with an oxygen atom form a molecule that en masse creates water would be hard pressed to come up with a well-thought answer to the question that would satisfy their own criteria for justified belief, especially if one were to insist on further justifications for the immediate answer.  If one is going to attack another’s worldview then one must be certain that one’s own worldview can stand up to the same level of scrutiny.

 
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Posted by on October 7, 2010 in musings

 

A Response to Geoffrey Berg’s “God Paradox” Part 2.

In this second part of my response to Geoffrey Berg’s “God Paradox’ the second premise of Berg’s argument is examined.  As before, all material in italics is Berg’s, my response will be in regular font.

The Second Premise: All that remains is to establish reasons for the inevitable universality of some uncertainty, at least three of which are available but any one of which would be sufficient in itself to prove the point.

a) The past cannot predict with certainty the future: The future cannot be known with certainty. Even if something has occurred 5 or 805 or countless times there is no guarantee it will hold true the next time. Even if an entity has been correct in all its previous predictions that does not ensure the correctness of all or even any of its future predictions. The universe or part of it may change unaccountably. For instance it may suddenly change from being a predominantly rational place into being a predominantly irrational place.

Objection 8:  Mr. Berg is implying that human modes of knowing reflect divine modes of knowing.  It is true that we as humans cannot know about the future using inductive methods but to extend that claim to God seems suspect, a projection of human qualities onto a non-human entity. Equating human reason, and the limits thereof, with divine reason is at best unfounded, at worst a category mistake.  Unless Berg can argue why we should accept this parity of reason between two wholly dissimilar entities we have no reason to accept this as being true of God.

Objection 9:  If the argument presented by Berg were sound and we accepted the premises, the examples, and their logical implications as true, we would have to remain uncertain about whether or not the conclusion obtained. We would still reasonably be able to deny a conclusion that shows the non-existence of God by appealling to the same arguments Berg has given us.  This state of affairs is red-flag for any philosophical argument.

For instance, Berg contends that the universe could go from being “a predominantly rational place into being a predominantly irrational place.” If we are uncertain about whether or not this is the case (based on Berg’s idea of uncertainty summed up in the maxim “everything must be fundamentally uncertain about its own relationship to its environment“), then it follows that the conclusion of any deductive logical proof (for logic to work we must presuppose that rationality prevails, of  which we cannot be certain) must also be uncertain.  

A further complication for Berg is that if the universe did change from being rational to irrational, and if  logical impossibilities are only impossibile in a world that remains rational (for it makes no sense to say that the rules of reason apply in a universe that is irrational), and if God is a logical impossibility as Berg contends, then God’s existence is still possible in such a universe.  To show that God was truly an impossible being, Berg would have to show that the universe (in its entirety, not just the part of the universe we inhabit) was still a place that could be understood.  However, to do that one would have to use experience and the inductive method to show that reason still prevails, yet as Berg argues, inductive reasoning can never predict the future state of affairs with any certainty.

Even if he could show the universe is rational at this point in time it does not mean that it will be rational at any point in the future, no matter how small the increment of time.  Ironically, this leads Berg into a paradoxical situation; to show God to be impossible one has to show that the universe is able to be understood using reason, yet this claim is undermined by an appeal to the same principles used to disprove God’s existence.  At this point it seems in all likelihood that his argument is self-defeating.

b) A question of limited intelligence: If you are a person of limited intelligence it might be that because you have limited intelligence you cannot know that you are a person of limited intelligence and more obviously it is quite likely that you would not know how your intellect is limited. Thus it is perfectly possible for any entity to be limited in its insight and because it is limited in its insight not have the least idea that it is limited in its insight. Such can be the case with people or with ‘apparent gods’. 

Even more important, nobody or no thing can know that it is not limited in its intellect (because if it were limited part of its limitation would quite likely be to fail to understand that it is limited!). So those that cannot ‘see’ any limitations to their intellect obviously cannot know for sure whether there are any limitations to their intellect.

Objection 10: While humans may not be aware of how we are limited (a statement that itself is not obviously true; most people have very real idea of how their understanding is limited) can we really make the claim for a being that is held by theistic definitions, the definitions against which Berg is ostensibly arguing, to be perfect in his understanding?  This is another instance of warrantlessly transferring human weaknesses onto a wholly non-human entity.

c) Power is a more difficult concept than it seems: Following from a) above power may only be a temporary phenomenon in any entity’s hands. Following from b) above no entity that exercises seemingly limitless power can be certain of the extent of its true power.

Objection 11: These claims are predicated upon Berg’s ill-defined, controversial,  implied definition of omniscience and his claim that God is a being necessarily in time, for if God is atemporal and eternal any essential quality that God possesses is also eternal and existing outside of time.  This part of the argument is just a re-hashing of parts of the first premise and not really a new claim that supports the second premise as Berg wants us to believe. The objections made against these assumptions also apply here.

However apart from those two points how can any entity be certain that it is not somehow only wanting and doing those things which it has power to do and not wanting those things which it in fact has not got power to do?

 Incidentally, how can any entity be sure it has free will? How can it tell the mechanism doesn’t work like this – something is going to happen and as a related part of that thing going to happen it (the candidate God) is also automatically made to want it to happen, and seeming to arrange its happening?

Berg’s argument begins to get very strange at this point, playing with the basic notions of temporality and causality.

Note: Underlying these reasons for universal uncertainty is the reality of the nature of knowledge and even power.

To claim that one understands the reality of knowledge, a topic on which tens of millions of words have been written over the last 2500 years with no definitive conclusion having yet been reached,  is more than a little hubristic, and philosophically unsophisticated. Worse still, no arguments have been given to show his understanding of this complex and highly controversial area of philosophy. 

Knowledge and power are not in themselves tangible, concrete qualities. Application of them may give concrete results but of themselves they can only ever be perceived by mental processes. That mental recognition results either from logic or experience.

 An entity that is potentially God, being unique and absolute, cannot use experience in the same way as we, who are neither unique nor absolute, can to approximately fit circumstances. Anyhow experience only yields provisional knowledge as environments are all liable to fundamental change from time to time. Therefore rational means are the only reliable means to absolute knowledge even for an entity of God’s apparent power. How even any potential God can be absolutely certain of future developments and of its own ability to for ever know them is a critical logical flaw in monotheism.

In essence most knowledge is a fleeting abstraction which none can possibly be sure of grasping, least of all for ever. There is no route nor sure mechanism for anything to be certain of gaining and maintaining overall knowledge.

The last few lines as just a rehashing of claims that have already been made and adds nothing to the overall argument.

Summary:

Mr. Berg’s argument is hardly irrefutable as claimed.  In fact, the argument seems not only to be refutable, it is self-refuting; the premises when taken to the logical conclusion demand that one reject the conclusion.   

Furthermore, Berg is conflating the concept of God with the entity itself.  Even if Berg’s argument was successful the best it could show, in fact the best that any logical argument for the non-existence of God can show, is that our concept of God is incoherent.  It does nothing to show that God qua God does not or cannot exist.  At best, all any argument of this type can do is argue that it is not rational to believe in a God described by the incoherent concept.

 
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Posted by on September 20, 2010 in Philosophy, philosophy of religion

 

A Response to Geoffrey Berg’s “God Paradox” Part 1.

*In this response to Mr. Berg’s argument all material taken from his argument have been italicized while my replies and objections to his claims will be in standard font.*

In this post I will examine Geoffrey Berg’s argument up to and including his explication of the first premise.  While Mr. Berg claims to have discovered a logical irrefutable argument for the non-existence of God, and as will be seen, this may be a gross overstatement on Berg’s behalf.

The Argument:

The argument of Universal Uncertainty stated as a logical paradox in relation to God is ‘GOD CANNOT EXIST BECAUSE ‘GOD’ CANNOT KNOW THAT IT IS GOD’. This means that an entity with God’s other properties cannot have the final property of certain knowledge nor even in the long term certain power consummating it as God. I put this forward as a logically irrefutable proposition.

As stated the proposition, ‘GOD CANNOT EXIST BECAUSE ‘GOD’ CANNOT KNOW THAT IT IS GOD’ does not constitute a paradox, unless of course God exists.

The premises for the argument are two:

1. an uncertain God is a contradiction in terms and ridiculous

2. uncertainty is logically universal within the Universe (‘Universe’ = ‘the totality of existence’) in the sense that everything must be fundamentally uncertain about its own relationship to its environment.

If the premises are true this argument is undeniable within reason.

Objection 1: Many theists have argued in great depth that God is not, and cannot be thought of as being, part of the universe; that God exists outside of the universe. Classical theology claims that God created the universe, hence was prior to and independent of the creation, for a creature cannot create the environment in which it already exists.  If the arguments of the theists are correct then what is true of the things in the universe does not necessarily apply to God, as God is not part of the set of all things that comprise the universe. If the conclusion of Berg’s argument relies on the truth of this premise, and if God is not part of the universe, then the argument fails at this point. 

In all fairness, it must be said that Berg makes mention of this type of objection on his website in a response entitled “Core Response to God is Outside Time/Our Universe.” In this short response he makes the following counter claims:

1) Nothing can exist outside of time or our universe.

2) If this world was created how can we identify the creative entity as God (a problem in the philosophy of religion about which much has been written called the “Problem of Identification”).

3) If another reality (different from the universe that humans experience) does exist, how can God be sure that there does not exist yet another differing reality?

4) The final counter claim is a restatement a version of the evidential problem of evil.

Objection 2: Berg’s definition of universe as the “totality of existence” needs justification if we are to accept this denotation of the word. Indeed it seems that much of Berg’s atheistic argument rests on this definition of universe.

Objection 3:  Even if it were true that “everything must be fundamentally uncertain about its own relationship to its environment” this does not show that God cannot have knowledge of God’s self (as the aforementioned paradox explicitly states), for this statement as it stands is a statement about an entity and its environment and not a statement about an entity and its essential nature.

Objection 4: If the universe is the totality of all creation (as thought by classical theism), and if God in the act of creating gains an understanding of that which God creates, then there is no true proposition about the universe that God does not, or cannot, know.  This would entail that  Berg’s statement “everything must be fundamentally uncertain about its own relationship to its environment” is untrue about God even if it is true about the universe.  This being untrue would then make his argument unsound, even if it were of a logically valid form.

Objection 5:  Furthermore, in saying that “everything must be fundamentally uncertain about its own relationship to its environment” is making a sweeping claim that needs to be justified with a rigorous argument that, unfortunately,  in this version of the argument is lacking. Furthermore, while this limit on the extent of knowledge may be true of human nature, we cannot in all fairness claim that the same limits apply to a being with a divine nature that is wholly different from ours; a claim that Berg assents to in one of the other disproofs in his text “The Six Ways of Atheism.” 

At first glance it seems that Berg’s argument is not as obviously sound as reckoned.

The First Premise: That an entity riddled with uncertainty cannot be the God of Christian, Jewish or Islamic religion is obvious. If the entity seemed like God in other ways but could not be certain of its own permanence (that it would not die), and could not be certain of the extent of its own power and knew therefore it lacked omniscience, it would be but a mockery of God.

Objection 6: Berg seems to be using a definition of omniscience that entails that God must have knowledge of God’s self, yet this definition, which Berg takes to be a given and which must obtain if his argument is to have any merit, is itself a contestable claim and not obviously true.  For God to be omniscient it may be sufficient that God know all (and only) true propositions about the universe external to God. It may even be the case that God must be unknown to God’s self in order to solve a little looked at but very important problem in the philosophy of religion, the Problem of Creation.  

Furthermore, it could not then ever be certain whether a yet greater entity exists beyond its understanding.

Objection 7:  This may be an interesting approach to a disproof of God’s existence but the argument so far does not point to this conclusion. Even if it could be shown that God lacked self-knowledge, this lack of self-knowledge does not necessarily entail a lack of knowledge about other entities that exist independently of God. 

 
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Posted by on September 16, 2010 in Philosophy, philosophy of religion

 

Geoffrey Berg’s “God Paradox.”

Below is an abridged version of an argument made by Geoffrey Berg in his 2009 book “The Six Ways of Atheism” that aims to show that the existence of God is logically impossible.  

Mr Berg has kindly given bloggers permission to reproduce the text of the argument as it appears on his website http://www.thesixwaysofatheism.com/ in order to stimulate discussion.

 

 

SYNOPSIS OF THE ARGUMENT OF UNIVERSAL  UNCERTAINTY TO DISPROVE THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

The Argument:

The argument of Universal Uncertainty stated as a logical paradox in relation to God is ‘GOD CANNOT EXIST BECAUSE ‘GOD’ CANNOT KNOW THAT IT IS GOD’. This means that an entity with God’s other properties cannot have the final property of certain knowledge nor even in the long term certain power consummating it as God. I put this forward as a logically irrefutable proposition.

The premises for the argument are two:

1. an uncertain God is a contradiction in terms and ridiculous

2. uncertainty is logically universal within the Universe (‘Universe’ = ‘the totality of existence’) in the sense that everything must be fundamentally uncertain about its own relationship to its environment.

If the premises are true this argument is undeniable within reason.

The First Premise: That an entity riddled with uncertainty cannot be the God of Christian, Jewish or Islamic religion is obvious. If the entity seemed like God in other ways but could not be certain of its own permanence (that it would not die), and could not be certain of the extent of its own power and knew therefore it lacked omniscience, it would be but a mockery of God. Furthermore, it could not then ever be certain whether a yet greater entity exists beyond its understanding. How could men pray to God not knowing whether even if it once existed it was not now dead or dying? Who would pray to a God itself uncertain of its own ability to answer prayers? It is bad enough that people are told to have faith in the existence of God, but isn’t it a bit much if ‘God’ also has to have faith in its own authentic existence as God? It has all the absurdity of the blind leading the blind.

The Second Premise: All that remains is to establish reasons for the inevitable universality of some uncertainty, at least three of which are available but any one of which would be sufficient in itself to prove the point.

a) The past cannot predict with certainty the future: The future cannot be known with certainty. Even if something has occurred 5 or 805 or countless times there is no guarantee it will hold true the next time. Even if an entity has been correct in all its previous predictions that does not ensure the correctness of all or even any of its future predictions. The universe or part of it may change unaccountably. For instance it may suddenly change from being a predominantly rational place into being a predominantly irrational place.

b) A question of limited intelligence: If you are a person of limited intelligence it might be that because you have limited intelligence you cannot know that you are a person of limited intelligence and more obviously it is quite likely that you would not know how your intellect is limited. Thus it is perfectly possible for any entity to be limited in its insight and because it is limited in its insight not have the least idea that it is limited in its insight. Such can be the case with people or with ‘apparent gods’. Even more important, nobody or no thing can know that it is not limited in its intellect (because if it were limited part of its limitation would quite likely be to fail to understand that it is limited!). So those that cannot ‘see’ any limitations to their intellect obviously cannot know for sure whether there are any limitations to their intellect.

c) Power is a more difficult concept than it seems: Following from a) above power may only be a temporary phenomenon in any entity’s hands. Following from b) above no entity that exercises seemingly limitless power can be certain of the extent of its true power.

However apart from those two points how can any entity be certain that it is not somehow only wanting and doing those things which it has power to do and not wanting those things which it in fact has not got power to do?

Incidentally, how can any entity be sure it has free will? How can it tell the mechanism doesn’t work like this – something is going to happen and as a related part of that thing going to happen it (the candidate God) is also automatically made to want it to happen, and seeming to arrange its happening?

Note: Underlying these reasons for universal uncertainty is the reality of the nature of knowledge and even power. Knowledge and power are not in themselves tangible, concrete qualities. Application of them may give concrete results but of themselves they can only ever be perceived by mental processes. That mental recognition results either from logic or experience. An entity that is potentially God, being unique and absolute, cannot use experience in the same way as we, who are neither unique nor absolute, can to approximately fit circumstances. Anyhow experience only yields provisional knowledge as environments are all liable to fundamental change from time to time. Therefore rational means are the only reliable means to absolute knowledge even for an entity of God’s apparent power. How even any potential God can be absolutely certain of future developments and of its own ability to for ever know them is a critical logical flaw in monotheism.

In essence most knowledge is a fleeting abstraction which none can possibly be sure of grasping, least of all for ever. There is no route nor sure mechanism for anything to be certain of gaining and maintaining overall knowledge.

Summary of this Argument:

God having to have faith it is in fact God is ridiculous. Many other possible explanations of a God-like entity’s situation can be imagined – any apparent God might only be and can never know that it is not only a temporary local potentate.

The concept of God is a logical impossibility. This is because some qualities that God must have to be God – including certainty and certain knowledge – cannot be logically reconciled with the fundamental position of any entity in relation to the totality of existence (i.e. the Universe) where ultimately uncertainty must prevail. As it is essential to our or any existence that the Universe must exist, it is therefore God that cannot logically (that is without self-contradiction) exist.

* Many thanks to Mr. G. Berg for allowing bloggers such as myself to share this argument.

 
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Posted by on September 15, 2010 in philosophy of religion